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Abstract
In the fight against Covid-19, many governments and businesses are in the process of evaluating,
trialling and even implementing so-called immunity passports. Also known as antibody or health cer-
tificates, there is a clear demand for this technology that could allow people to return to work without
placing others at risk. One of the major criticisms of health certificates is that they could be misused to
unfairly discriminate against those without immunity, allowing the formation of an ‘immuno-privileged’
class of people. In this work we are motivated to explore an alternative technical solution that is non-
discriminatory by design. In particular we propose health tokens — randomised health certificates which,
using methods from differential privacy, allow individual test results to be randomised whilst still allowing
useful aggregate risk estimates to be calculated. We show that health tokens could mitigate immunity-
based discrimination whilst still presenting a viable mechanism for estimating the collective transmission
risk posed by small groups of users. In particular, we evaluate the viability of our approach in the context
of constant-flow and batched use cases and then consider a number of possible attacks. Our experimental
results show that for groups of size 200 or more, the error associated with our method is acceptable and
the aggregated results may be of use.
1 Introduction
A number of antibody certificate solutions have already been proposed [1, 4, 2, 5, 6] and there has been
significant discussion of both the technical, social and ethical implications of the technology [7, 3, 8]. One
of the main concerns raised by antibody certificates is that they could be misused to unfairly discriminate
against people with respect to their immunity-based status. It has been proposed [6] that antibody certificates
should not restrict peoples access to services, or freedom of travel, but could instead be useful as a tool for
measuring aggregate transmission risk levels. To this end we approach this work with two assumptions in
mind:
1. Immunity status is an attribute that should not be a basis for discrimination.
2. It is useful to know the ratio (or count) of immune vs non-immune people that have accessed a service
over a period of time — for example customers in a shop over a number of hours.
In this paper we develop the idea of a health token: a randomised health certificate that allows the
collective transmission risk posed by groups of users to be estimated whilst also protecting individuals from
immunity-based discrimination by allowing for plausible deniability of the value of the certificate.
Unlike previous work on antibody certificates, randomised health tokens are unlikely to be used to restrict
access to services or transportation due to the uncertainty introduced in their true value. Consequently, there
is less incentive for fraud and so the need to bind each user to their token is greatly diminished. Our health
tokens comprise only a digitally signed, differentially private transmission risk status that allows aggregate
transmission risk statistics to be computed.
In our proposed system, the transmission risk1 of each user is first evaluated by a healthcare provider,
who then introduces some randomness to sign and issue the user a token. Note we assume that a measure
of transmission risk exists and that it can be accurately determined. Our system is independent of how the
1Here we use the term transmission risk as an indicator of how likely a person is transmit the virus.
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infection risk is calculated and can support any number of different risk profiles, for example a scale of 1 to
k.
In Section 2 we detail our proposed system and in Section 3 we consider two types of use case: constant-
flow cases such as shops and batched cases such as aeroplanes. We consider and analyse some possible attacks
on our system in Section 4. Finally in Section 5 we discuss some limitations of this method and conclude.
2 Non Discriminatory Token System
Our system consists of three phases: issue, check and aggregate. In the issue phase a healthcare provider
assesses a user and then issues them with a cryptographically signed health token. In the check phase the
service provider records the value of the users token. Finally the aggregate phase allows the service provider
to reconstruct the overall transmission risk associated with the ‘checked’ tokens.
2.0.1 Token System
Here we present the three phases of our system in turn. First we denote the three stakeholders as follows:
the healthcare provider Henry (H), the user Alice (A) and the service provider Verity (V, alliterative for
verifier). Let protocolDP denote the differential privacy protocol that we use to compute our health tokens,
then the three phases of our system are as follows:
Issue
1. H assesses A’s transmission risk indicator to be itrue ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
2. H computes token ← protocolDP (itrue , ) and produces {token}sgnH for A.
Check
1. A presents {token}sgnH to V before accessing a service.
2. V verifies the signature and records the value token.
Aggregate
1. V finds the frequency, f , of each element of {0, . . . , k − 1} amongst the tokens it has received.
2. V debiases the frequency estimates as per Equation 1 to get an unbiased estimate of the the sum of
the tokens it collected.
Each token is signed by H. The signature will be unique for each certificate thus can be used as an
identifier for each certificate. We denote this by CID — certificate identification number.
2.0.2 The Differential Privacy Protocol
We use the differential privacy technique of randomised response to produce a token based on the transmission
risk status of a user as evaluated by a healthcare provider. Informally, the protocol which we denote
protocolDP works as follows.
The input is the users true risk status itrue ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, which can be one of k options, and . Here, 
is a measure of the trade-off between privacy and accuracy; a low value of epsilon provides high privacy, but
low utility (as the underlying distribution is more random) and vice versa. The protocol outputs itrue with
probability e
−1
e+k−1 , else we select a uniformly random response from {0, . . . , k − 1}. Note that it is possible
to select a response at random and to still end up telling the truth by chance.
An unbiased estimate fˆ of the frequency f of a given option is calculated by putting the frequency it is
returned as a response, f˜ , into the following formula:
fˆ =
e + k − 1
e − 1 (f˜ − 1/k). (1)
2
Error in re-aggregating the data is, of course, introduced with such a method. We quantify this error in
our experiments in Section 5.
3 Use Cases
We consider two classes of use case for our proposed system: constant-flow and batched cases. A constant-
flow use case is where a service provider can constantly offer their service to an arbitrary number of users,
for example a shop — here risk must continuously be monitored. Batched cases are those in which there
is a fixed number of users that may access a particular service, for example aeroplanes and workplaces. In
batched scenarios the level of risk must be assessed when selecting which and how many people are allowed
to enter. After discussing both cases we conclude that our system is only suitable for constant-flow cases.
Constant-flow cases
We consider a shop that wants to monitor the level of transmission risk inside at any one time. We construct
a rudimentary risk model that demonstrates how our system could add benefit.
Let R be the natural number that represents the upper bound on acceptable risk in a shop at any one
time and let T be the set of health tokens associated to people currently in the shop. Then r =
∑
t∈T t is
a measure of the total transmission risk in the shop2. We let tn and te denote the token value of the next
customer (in the queue to enter) and the exiting customer (the next customer to exit the shop). The next
customer is let if and only if r − ie + in ≤ R.
Moreover it may be beneficial to aggregate the cumulative level of risk the shop has been exposed to over
the course of a day or week — this may help guide when cleaning is most required, for example.
We reiterate that the risk model we have presented here is primitive. The method however could be
abstracted to any risk model that is based on the customers token value. For example, it could take into
account the size of the shop, the current staffing levels, or even the current spatial distribution of customers
in the shop.
Batched cases
Here we consider the example of filling seats on an aeroplane based on transmission risk. The objective
function is ill-defined however the airline would likely want to limit risk while also filling as many seats as
possible.
One can imagine a process where at the time of check-in, a passenger must also submit their health
token value and the airline can compute an aggregated risk value in the same way as a shop does in the
previous constant-flow case. Immediately however a number of issues present themselves, for example: (1)
a passenger’s health token is associated to their identity through their passport, (2) this association can
be remembered and could be used to unfairly impact users with unfavourable health token values such as
when purchasing insurance or booking future flights and (3) airlines are incentivised to allow only low risk
passengers on-board (to maximise flight capacity) thus reintroducing discrimination.
These issues suggest that our proposal is not suitable for any cases where a personal identity must be
submitted alongside a health token. While these are somewhat specific to the airline industry they could be
abstracted to other batch use cases, for example theatres or train travel. Moreover, we argue that many batch
use cases will not be a suitable application on the grounds that they are generally in a confined environment;
having one user with high risk status can more adversely affect others than in the constant-flow use case.
This concern is exaggerated by the error applied to each user’s health token by our differential privacy
protocol. In general we perceive that most batched use cases will suffer from similar issues and that they
should be avoided (for the time being).
2Note this has an error associated with it due to the randomness of the health tokens introduced in the Issue phase.
3
4 Attacks and Analysis
In this section we first define three attack vectors we deem likely and then analyse the constant-flow use case
with respect to them.
4.1 Attack Vectors
Here we define three main attacks on our system. The first two are Sybil-type attacks, we denote them
Sybil-type A and Sybil-type B, and the third considers an adversary who is passively observing the flow of
users and trying to learn the transmission risk status of people accessing services.
Sybil-type A A Sybil-type A adversary attempts to disrupt a service provider by repeatedly presenting
a set of compromised tokens to a service provider. For example, if the adversary presented tokens that
indicated a high level of risk, the service provider may be forced to close or act more cautiously.
Sybil-type B A Sybil-type B adversary builds on the type A adversary. Here the adversary attempts
to use a set of compromised tokens to attack multiple service providers. We envisage an adversary could
corrupt real users phones with malware that overwrites the original certificate to the one of their choosing.
Queue Observer This adversary is interested in inferring a persons true transmission risk status by
monitoring when they are allowed (and when they are refused) entry to services. We assume this adversary
may be interested in monitoring a user over a long period of time.
4.2 Analysis of Attacks
When analysing the Sybil-type attacks we assume the adversary does not have access to a large number of
valid health tokens — that is we assume they only have access to a small number of compromised certificates
which they can use. On one hand this is reasonable as a valid certificate is signed by H and thus cannot be
forged. On the other hand since our health tokens are not binding, a malicious user can easily use a token
that was issued to someone else. Indeed, a malicious user could easily post their health token online for
others to use should they choose. Under this informal assumption, which it is important to debate beyond
this work, we show how Sybil-type attacks can be mitigated.
Sybil-type A As our health tokens are non-binding, an adversary may attack a service provider by repeat-
edly presenting a compromised health token of their choosing. A determined adversary may even convince
many users, unsuspecting or otherwise, to present a singular compromised token that has been distributed
online for this purpose.
To prevent this attack a service provider can simply count the number of times each CID is seen in the
period of a day or week. In this way a limit can be imposed on the number of times each certificate can be
used over a given period of time. For an adversary to effectively use such an attack despite this mitigation
they would need access to a large number of signed tokens with their desired value. In practice they would
also need to convince or trick many individuals into using them.
Sybil-type B By rate-limiting the number of uses of each token with respect each service provider, the
adversary is limited to attempting to present each of the compromised tokens they hold the maximum number
of times and to as many different service providers as possible. Such an adversary might try to alter the
overall risk aggregates across a country, or on a smaller scale might try all the shops in a particular shopping
mall or tube station.
To prevent this more widespread attack we need to monitor the usage of a certificate across multiple
service providers. There are at least two methods of achieving this: (1) a central body requests and aggre-
gates the usage count of each health token across multiple service providers and (2) the service providers
communicate directly with each other to learn which certificates are being used the most — here we envisage
a multi-party computation protocol might be used to do so in a privacy-preserving way.
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While it is often desirable to avoid using a central authority where possible, it is likely that method
(2) will both involve too large a communication overhead and place too much burden on service providers.
Therefore in this work we only consider solutions using method (1). Naor et al. [9] present a secure method
to find ‘heavy hitting passwords’ (i.e. commonly used passwords) using a central authority. This solution
can also be applied here to allow a central authority to learn, in a privacy-preserving way, if there are any
health tokens with an unreasonably large usage across multiple service providers. We outline the details of
this approach for this application in Appendix A.
Queue Observer No adversary can be confident of knowing the users true transmission risk status because
the randomised response that is applied to each health token provides plausible deniability. However, an
adversary who tracks a user across multiple service providers could learn (with a degree of uncertainty) a
users token value.
To stop an adversary that observes multiple queues, service providers or policy makers could introduce
batch admission to services. With this proviso, any information an adversary can learn by observing a user
is masked by the other users in the batch.
5 Limitations and Conclusion
Here we discuss some limitations of our proposed approach and then conclude.
Randomisation of risk status Our system perturbs a users true transmission risk status with some
randomness to produce a health token value. As highlighted by our conclusion that the system is not
suitable for batched use cases, it is essential that health tokens are only used when considering a large
aggregate and not for single use cases. For example, determining if a user is allowed into a care home is
probably best left to a system with strong user-certificate binding such as [6].
We illustrate the error associated with our method by calculating the average error in computing the
expected value of a health token (E[X]) for a set number of users. We let k = 2 and let  = log 3 which
corresponds to outputting the correct risk status in the first step of the underlying differential privacy
protocol (as described in Section 2.0.2) with probability 12 . We iterate the experiment 100 times for each
number of users from 1 to 500. The results, given in Figure 1, show that the error reduces to approximately
0.03 for 500 users. In other words, the average error over 500 customers’ health token values when entering
a shop is 0.03 away from the real risk status itrue as determined by H in the issue phase of the system. Note
if we increase k the error will increase for the same .
No binding As the tokens are not binding, their misuse is harder to mitigate or track. As the Sybil-type
attacks show, it is possible that compromised certificates could be used maliciously by adversaries. It is
also possible (e.g. for batched use cases) that a user will be incentivised to be tested repeatedly until they
get issued a more desirable health token value; In other words a user with an undesirable risk status is
incentivised by our system to test again (or to bribe their healthcare provider).
Conclusion In this work we were motivated to develop a tool for measuring the viral transmission risk
of groups of users that by design mitigates immunity-based discrimination. While there are a number
of important limitations to our proposal of health tokens, we have shown that under certain situations our
approach has the potential to have a net-positive benefit on society. Aside from the benefits already discussed
in this paper, users who would be reluctant to engage with a system that binds them to a certificate (e.g.
due to fear of being traced) may be more likely to engage with the system presented here — increased
participation will result in more accurate risk analysis.
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A Preventing Sybil-type B attacks
Naor et al. [9] presented a solution to the problem of identifying commonly used passwords. Their method
can be used in our context to identify commonly used certificates. Here the situations are analogous as the
original solution wanted to observe password outliers with respect their frequency of use, and we would like
to observe certificate outliers with respect their frequency of use. We claim no contribution to the method
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we present here in any way, only reproduce the solution in our context for ease of the reader. The solution
employs a central authority to ‘tally’ the CIDs in a secure manner as follows:
1. Each time a check is performed (by V), V hashes the CID presented, vj = H(CIDj ) — assume this is
an l-bitstring.
2. The server sends a uniformly distributed random l-bitstring rj .
3. V sends back the one bit value of the inner product of vj and rj over GF[2], denoted as 〈vj , rj〉.
4. The server keeps a table T[x] of 2l counters, corresponding to all possible l-bit values x (initialized to
zero on system setup).
5. For every value of x if 〈x, rj〉 = 〈vj , rj〉 the corresponding counter is incremented by one, otherwise it
is decreased by one. Equality holds for exactly half of the values, that we call the “correlated” values.
Let the total number of service providers that ran the protocol be N , and let p be the frequency of the
hash value x. The expected numbers of increments and decrements are N(p+ (1−p)2 ) and N
(1−p)
2 respectively.
The expected value of the counter is E(T [x]) = pN . For a threshold frequency τ , the server publishes all
x values such as T [x] > τN . Each V checks if H(CID) is in the published hash values list. V can then act
accordingly, either by discarding the certificate in the aggregation, or refusing entry to the user.
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